RECENT CASES by unknown
RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
LANDLORD AND TENANT-NOTICE TO QUIT-WAvER BY LANDLORD.-
ARCADE INv. Co. v. G-mzrE, iog N. W. 250 (MINN.).-Held: A notice to quit,
given by the landlord to a tenant, may be waived by the landlord. Henceforth
the notice is inoperative. It is an established rule that a notice to quit may
be waived by the reception of rent after notice has been given. Stedman v.
McIntosh, 27 N. C. 571. But mere demand of rent does not constitute a
waiver, Condon v. Barr, 47 N. J. Law 113, nor receiving back rent due prior
to hotice. Norris v. Morril, 43 N. H. 213. So a landlord giving a second
notice after the expiration of first one, waives right of proceeding on first
notice. Morgan v. Powers, 31 N. Y. Supp. 954. Likewise a notice to a tenant
by a landlord, touching the termination of the tenancy, the same recognizing
the existence of a lease, amounts to a waiver of former notice Dockwill v.
Schenk, 37 Ill. (App.) 44. Conversely, a tenant giving landlord notice that
he intends to quit and then holds over, the tenancy is regarded as continuing,
Graham v. Dempsey, 169 Pa. 46o; notwithstanding some accidental cause
keeps the tenant over. Mason v. Wiereng, 113 Mich. 151. In New York,
however, a contrary doctrine is held. Herter v. Muller, 159 N. Y. 28, in
which case three judges dissented.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-DEmEcTIVE APPLIANcES.-
KENTUCKY AND INDIANA BRIDGE AND R. Co. v. MORAN, 8o N. E. (IND.) 536.-
Held, It is the duty of the master to exercise ordinary care to furnish or pro-
vide machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for his employees,
and to exercise a reasonable supervision in keeping them in a reasonably safe
condition for use. It is the duty of the master to use such care in providing
safe and proper machinery and appliances, and in keeping the same in repair,
as prudent and careful men, similarly engaged, exercise. Gorns v. Chicago
R. L & P. R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 221. A master is bound to use all reasonable
care, diligence, and caution in providing for the safety of those in his employ,
in furnishing them with safe, sound, and suitable appliances, and in keeping
the same, Haugh v. Rissner, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 664; Frank & Otis, I5 N. Y. St.
Rep. 68r. It is the duty of a master to use reasonable and ordinary care
and foresight in procuring appliances to be used by his servants. Dedrick v.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 21 Mo. App. 433.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT.-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES.-
KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT.-ALvES v. NEW YORx, N. H. & H. R. Co., 65 AmL.
261. (R. I.).-Held, an employee cannot recover from a railroad company for
injuries caused by the breaking of a handle of a hand car by reason of defects
in that porton of the handle which is fastened in the iron socket, and which
cannot be discovered without removing it from the socket, in the absence
of proof of the actual knowledge of the defect Wood on the Law of Master
and Servant, Section 322, says in substance that a servant in order to recover
damages for injuries must prove negligence on the part of his master and due
care on his own part, besides having two presumptions to rebut, (I) That the
master has discharged his duty and (2) That he had no knowledge of the
defect. The cases in point certainly seem to sustain this statement Two
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cases hold that an employer cannot be charged with negligence unless he knew
of the defect. Simpson v. Pittsburg Locomotive Works, 139 Pa. 245; Druig v.
New York, 0. & W. R. Co., 26 N. Y. Supp. 4o5. The court in the case of
Bogenschuic v. Smith, 84 Ky. 33o, held that the plaintiff in order to recover
damages must show, among other things, a knowledge of the master that a
defect existed. When a defect is unknown to both it has also been held that
the servant cannot recover. The Mad River and Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. Bar-
ber, 5 Ohio S. R. 541.
MASTER AND SERVANT-JOINT LIAniLITy-TADE UNIONS.-WYEMAN V.
DEADY, ET AL., 65 Am. 129 (CoNN.).-Held, a labor union and its walking
delegate, who procured plaintiff's discharge from employment, by means of
threats made to plaintiff's employers, with the knowledge, approval, and
authority of the union, were liable for plaintiff's discharge as joint tort-
feasors.
"Interference by fraud or force with the free exercise of another's trade
or occupation or means of livelihood is a tort . . . Where a violent or
malicious act is done to a man's occupation, profession, or means of obtain-
ing a livelihood, then an action lies in all cases." Addison on Torts, 9-14.
In accord with this doctrine it has been decided that an actor had a right of
action against people who by jeering at him forced his employer to discharge
him. Gregory v. Brunswick, 6 Man. & Ge. 2o5. It seems to prevail that any-
one causing a contract to be broken between two parties to the injury of one
of them is liable thereto. Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 2o6. In the case of
Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 338, it was held that, while it might not be
unlawful to persuade one to break a contract, it would certainly be an action-
able case if persuasion is used maliciously to the injury of the plaintiff or
benefiting the defendant at the plaintiff's expense.
MECHANICS' LIENS-CREATION OF LIEN-STATTEs.-VoLKER-ScoWCRFr
LUmBER Co. v. VANCE, 88 PAc. REP. (UTAH) 896.-Held: That in the absence
of an express contract creating a lien, the lien which a material man becomes
entitled to depends solely on the statute for its existence, for his lien is a
preference which he may secure by proceeding in a particular way and com-
plying with the statutory requirements on the subject, and not otherwise.
Mechanics' Lien Acts are an innovation upon common law, which gave no
such lien, Belanger v. Hersey, go Ill. 70; Associates of the Jersey Co. v.
Davison, 29 N. J. L. 415; equity also raises no lien in relation to real estate
except that of a vendor for purchase money, Ellison v. Jackson Water Co.,
12 Cal. 542; therefore, being remedial, White Lake Lumber Co. v. Russell, 22
Neb. 126; they must be strictly construed, I Bl. Comm. 87; Logan & Cook v.
Atfix, 7 Iowa 77; and claimant must comply with all the requirements of the
statute, not only in creating the lien, but also in its continuance and enforce-
ment. Wagner v. Briscoe, 38 Mich. 587; Mushlitt v. Silverman, 5o N. Y. 36o.
There are cases in regard to the last point resulting in two different views,
first, that the privileges under these statutes are stricti juris, and party claim-
ing under them must point to express law which gives him such right of
preference, Laudry v. Blanchard, 16 La. Ann. 173; Willard v. Magoon, 3o
Mich. 273; second, that the acts are not to be construed strictissimi juris but
so as to secure substantial justice, Putnam v. Ross, 46 AM1o. 337; the substan-
tial requirement must, however, have been in good faith. White v. Claffin, 32
Ark. 59.
RECENT CASES
MONOPoLIES--CoNTRACT-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CoNTNENTAL WALL
PAP R Co. v. LEWIS VOIGHT SONS Co., 148 Fed. 939.Held, that where a com-
bination of manufacturers and wholesalers of wall paper was claimed to be
in restraint of trade and in violation of the congressional anti-trust act of
i8go (Act July 2, I89o, c. 647, 26 Stat. 29), it was immaterial to the validity
of the combination that the agreement was valid at common law as imposing
only a reasonable restraint on competition, provided the direct result of its
operation was to directly restrain freedom of commerce between the states or
with foreign nations.
Under this act any combination that imposes restraint is unlawful,
whether legal or illegal at common law, United States v. Freight Ass'n, 166
U. S. 29o, and it is immaterial whether the restraint is fair and reasonable
or whether it actually results in raising the price of the commodity dealt in.
United States v. Coal Dealers Ass'n, 85 Fed. 252; United States v. Ass'n,
171 U. S. 505.
NEGLIGENCE-CARE AS TO LICENSEE.-RoSENTHAL V. UNITD DREssED B=as
Co., 1o N. Y. SUP. 532.-Held, that where there was a means of access to a
slaughter house through the defendant's premises, a customer of the owner
,of the slaughter house passing through defendant's premises to reach the
same was a mere licensee to whom defendant owed no duty of active care.
It is only where a party comes on the premises of another by invitation
either express or implied, that the owner assumes the obligation of providing
a safe and suitable means of ingress and egress and of moving about the
premises. The South Bend Iron Works v. Larger, ii Ind. App. 367; Rear-
don v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267. A person, whose only right to use certain
premises consists of the fact that the owner does not object to such use, is a
mere licensee, McCarn v. Thilemaun, 36 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 145, and one who
enjoys such permission is only relieved of being a trespasser, Vanderbeck,
Vanderbeck and Pierson v. Hendry, 34 N. J. Law 467, and must assume all
ordinary risk attached to the nature of the place or the business carried on.
Faris v. Hoberg, et al., 134 Ind 269.
OFFICERS-COMPENSATION.-STEPHENS V. Crry OF OLDTowN, 65 Am1 5
(Mr..).-Held, that a public officer for the performance of his official duties
is entitled to such compensation only as is fixed by law for that office. If no
compensation has been thus fixed, he is not entitled to any.
Williams v. Chariton County, 85 Mo. 645, held that no fees are allowed
an officer, except where expressly given and allowed by law. This doctrine
was upheld even more strongly in the case, Hatch v. Maine, 15 Wend.
(N. Y.) 45, which held, not only that a public officer cannot recover for extra
compensation for the redition of his duties, but that such an agreement if
made would be against public policy. In an Alabama case it was held that a
person who accepted an office took an office curn onere and if no compensation
was fixed for the redition of duties of that office they were presumed to be
gratuitous. State ex rel. Pollard, Jr., v. Brewer, 59 Ala. 13o. The same
principle is found in Carroll County Commissioners v. Gresham, 1oi Ind. 53.
In the old Connecticut case of Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 471, it was held
that an officer could not recover on a note given to him for compensation for
services rendered by him which he was legally bound to carry out. Such
an agreement being contrary to public policy.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-MUTUAL RIGHTS-ACTING FOR ADVERSE 
PARTIES.-
COMPENSATION.-ATTERBURY v. HOPKINS ET AL., 99 S. W. (Mo.) ii.-Held,
If an agent employed by one party acts secretly for the other also, he cannot
recover compensation from his employer, who was not aware of the 
dual
agency. An agent cannot obtain a commission from his principal for buying,
where, unknown to such principal, he has received a commission from the
seller. Finsley v. Penniman, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 591. An agent. who, in
procuring subscriptions to the stock of a corporation fraudulently and
without the knowledge of the company, received rewards from subscribers
for procuring their lands to be taken by company, cannot recover compensa-
tion from the company. Cleveland & St. L. R. Co. v. Patterson, 15 Ind. 7o.
An agent cannot recover compensation for his services where he acted for
both parties without the knowledge of the party who employed him. Huff-
cut on Agency, p. io2.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL-KNowLEDGE OF AGENT.-
BADGER v. COOK, ioi N. Y. SUPP. io67.-Held: That the burden is on a party
seeking to charge a principal with knowledge of his agent acquired in a differ-
ent transaction and before the agency existed to show by clear and satis-
factory evidence that the knowledge was present in the agent's mind at the
time of the transaction under the agency.
The general rule is that notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice
thereof to the principal when it is connected with the subject-matter of the
agency. Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391. Likewise if acquired pending the
proceedings. Johnston v. Laflin, 1o3 U. S. 8oo. The old English rule was
that notice of facts to the agent to bind the principal by constructive notice
should be in the same transaction. Warrick v. Warrick, 3 Atk. 291. This
was later modified to the extent that when one transaction is closely fol-
lowed by and connected with another, it is constructive notice to the principal,
Hargreaves v. Rothwell, I Keen 154. But it is also held that agent must
actually have it in mind at time of the second transaction. Nixon v. Hamil-
ton, 2 Dru. & W. 364. The Distilled Spirits, 78 U. S. (II Wall.) 356. This
rule holds good when knowledge is obtained when acting outside of his
employment. Wilson v. Minn. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Asso., 36 Minn., 112;
also extends to corporations and their officers. New Milford First Nat. Bank
v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93. Except when agent is engaged in commit-
ting an independent fraudulent act on his own account. Allen v. South Bos-
ton R. Co., i5o Mass. 206. Burden of proof is upon the party who seeks to
charge the principal with notice by reason of such knowledge of agent. Con-
stant v. University of Rochester, iII N. Y. 604.
SALES-ARTCLES TO BE MANUFACTURED-CoNTRAT-BREAcH-WAivER-
ROBERT GAIn Co. v. LYON, ET AL., ioi NEW YORK SuPP. 787. A manufacturer
received an order from a dealer for the manufacture of cartons to contain 
a
specified address and to be delivered in installments. The manufacturer
delivered an installment which did not contain the address, but which the
dealer accepted and paid for. The manufacturer delivered a second install-
ment, which the dealer refused to accept on the ground that the cartons did
not contain the address. Held, that the dealer's acceptance of the first
installment did not amount to a waiver of h',; right to reject the second. A
strict and literal performance in accordance A% ith the terms of a contract is, as
RECENT CASES
a rule, required, Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N. Y. 4o7. If the contract is not per-
formed in accordance with the terms, the retention of the goods after the
defect has been discovered is a waiver of the defect. Titley v. Enterprise
Store Co., 18 Ill. 457. If the goods are to be delivered in installments, and
the vendee on receiving part of the goods retains them, he waives any breach
of the contract by the vendor, Shields v. Pettee, 2 Land. L. C. R. 262 N. Y.,
and accepting part of the goods and paying for them will justify the vendor
in making subsequent deliveries of goods in accordance with the terms of the
contract, Miller v. Moore, 83 Ga. 685, but if the vendor cannot deliver goods
in accordance with the terms of the contract, any installment which goes to
the essence of the contract may be refused by the vendee. Norrington v.
Wright, 115 U. S. 188. Where there is a contract for the sale of goods deliv-
erable in installments, which are to be paid for on delivery, and the seller
makes defective delivery in respect to one installment, or the buyer fails
to take delivery of or pay for an installment, the question arises whether the
breach gives rise merely to a claim for compensation or to a right to treat
the whole contract as repudiated. It is difficult to reconcile the English cases
upon this point. Some say it is a breach going to the root of the matter,
Hoare v. Rennig, 5 Hurl. & U. ig, while the opposite view is upheld in the
leading case of Simpson v. Griffin, L. L 8 Q. B. 14. In this country the same
conflict arises, but the Supreme Court has held it is such a breach. Nor-
rington v. Wright, supra.
SEDucrioN-CmIMINAL PRosEcuTIoN-EVIENcE-ADMIssIBuiTY.-STATE
v. BENNETT, Io N. W. 15o (IA.)-Held, that in a prosecution for seduction,
the prosecutrix was properly permitted to testify that she yielded her person
to the defendant's embraces because of his promises. The disqualification of
parties as witnesses in their own behalf being now practically obsolete
throughout our land as witnesses they may testify to intent or motive.
Wigmore Ev., Section 581. In accordance, it was held no error to ask the
prosecutrix if, at the time of her seduction, she believed that defendant would
marry her. Armstrong v. People, 7o N. Y. 38. And in State v. Brinkhaus, 34
Minn. 285, and Ferguson v. State, 71 Miss. 805, it was held that prosecutrix
might testify that she permitted the intercourse because of the promises of
marriage. But the accused may testify in rebuttal that prosecutrix knew he
was engaged to be married to a third person. State v. Brown, 86 Ia. 121.
Probably, in Alabama alone is the prosecutrix not permitted to testify to the
motive which induced her to sexual intercourse. Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527.
SLANDER-WoRDS ACTIONABLE PER SE.-BATTLEs v. TYSON, iio N. W. 299
(NEB.).-Held, to charge a woman with being a lewd character, of using her
body for commercial purposes, and with keeping a gambling room, is action-
able, per se.
It is not necessary in order to render words actionable per se, that they
bear criminal import If the words in their ordinary acceptation, would
naturally and presumably be understood as importing a charge of crime,"
they are prima facie actionable. Stroebel v. Whitney, i8 N. W. 98
(Minn.). So charging a party with keeping a gambling place is sufficient
to charge a crime and so is actionable. Buckley v. O'Neil, 113 Mass. 193.
In Ross v. Fitch, 58 Fed. 148, it was hbld that words, imputing a want
of chastity of a female are not actionable per se, but that specific damages
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must be alleged and shown. But the common law rule has been greatly
modified in many of our states, and words spoken imputing a want of chastity
are actionable, per se, on the ground that such words tend to hinder her
advancement in life, by degrading her in the eyes of respectable people,
Cleveland v. Deitweiler, 18 Ia. 299. And some of the states have modified
the common law rule by statute, making words, implying a want of chastity,
actionable per se. Newman v. Stein, 75 Mich. 402; Mason v. Stratton, i N.
Y. Supp. 511; Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430.
TRADE-MARKS-UNFAIR CoAPE riTioN-INJUNcTIoN-BANzHAF ET AL. V.
CHASE, 88 PAC. 704 (CAL.). Without regard to whether plaintiffs have, or
can have, a trade-mark in the words "Old Homestead," stamped on bread
manufactured by them, the stamping into bread manufactured by the defend-
ants of the words "New Homestead," in letters and words of the same size,
style, and arrangement, being for the purpose, and with the result of, appro-
priating plaintiff's trade, held that, the defendant will be enjoined, on the
ground of fraud.
The general rule of law applicable to this case is that, where a manufac-
turer has applied a peculiar and distinctive label to designate his goods, and
has so used it that his goods are designated by it, a court of equity will
restrain another party from adopting and using one so similar that its use is
likely to confusion by purchasers exercising the ordinary degree of caution
which purchasers are in the habit of exercising with respect to such goods.
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n. v. Clark, 26 Fed. 41o. Although plaintiff
cannot acquire the exclusive right to use the word "American" as descriptive
of beer, yet it is entitled to an injunction where an imitation of its signs,
bearing that word conspicuously, so closely resembles theirs in size and col-
ored lettering as to deceive the public. American Brewing Co. v. St. Louis
Brewing Co., 47 Mo. App. 14. Where the plaintiff has for a number of years
used the word "Portland" to distinguish his stoves from others on the mar-
ket, a rival dealer will be restrained from advertising and selling a different
stove as the "Famous Portland," Van Horn v. Coogan, 52 N. J. Eq. 38o.
In order to constitute an infringement it is not necessary that the imita-
tion should be exact. It is sufficient that there is such a substantial similarity
that the public would be deceived. Cooley on Torts, (3 Ed.) 732.
TRUSTS-DEPOSITS IN BANKS-DEATH OF BENEFICIARIES-EFFECT.-IN
RE UNITED STATES TRUST Co. OF NEW YORK, io2 N. Y. SuPP. 27.-Held, that
a trust created by a father by his depositing money in a bank in his name, in
trust for a son, terminates ipso facto on the son's death in the life-time of the
father, and thereafter the fund remains the property of the father unimpressed
by any trust. Ingraham, J., dissenting.
The deposit of funds in a bank in the name of the depositor in trust for
another does not thereby create an irrevocable trust. Matter of Totten, 179
N. Y. 112; Clark v. Clark, io8 Mass. 522. And unless there is some evidence
of an intention of so doing, Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266; Estate of Smith,
144 Pa. St 428, the title to the funds remains in the depositor. Cleveland
v. Hampdon Savings Bank. 182 AMass. io. Even in those jurisdictions that
hold that where the depositor dies before the beneficiary, leaving the trust
open and unexplained, the latter is entitled to the deposit, Martin v. Funk,
75 N. Y. 134; Conn. River Savings Bank z. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, it would seem
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that the beneficiary, having no interest in the fund previous to the depositor's
death, Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, would have no interest or
title to pass to his personal representatives if he died during the life-time of
the depositor. Peoples Savings Bank v. Wells, 21 R. I. 21&
TRuSTs-RESULTING TRUST.-ATLANTIC Crry R. Co. v. JoHANsoN, 65 Am.
719 (N. J. Ch.)-Held, that where defendant street railroad in ejectment
purchased the land by parol from the predecessor in title of plaintiff, and paid
the consideration and entered into possession, a subsequent purchase of the
land from the record owner by plaintiff is with notice, and constitutes the
subsequent purchaser a trustee for the benefit of the prior purchaser.
A resulting trust arises by implication of law and not from contract.
Potter v. Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, and the Statute of Frauds is not applicable.
Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267. So an equitable estate exists in the pur-
chaser of lands where the contract has been fully performed by the parties
except as to the delivery of the deed. Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27.
Whatever is sufficient to put a reasonably careful man upon inquiry is notice,
Abell v. Brown, 55 Md. 222; e. g., possession of the land by one who is not
the record owner. Ferrin v. Errol, 59 N. H. 234. Therefore, if one pur-
chases from a trustee, with knowledge, actual or constructive, he himself
becomes the trustee of the property. Sadler!s Appeal, 87 Pa. 154. The ven-
dor of an estate who has received the purchase money, but retains the legal
title, being a mere trustee for his vended, Waddington v. Banks, I Brock. 97,
when a vendee is in the occupation of land which the vendor afterwards sells
to another to whom he transfers the evidence of legal title, the subsequent
purchaser is charged with notice, and will be considered as holding the legal
title as a trustee for the first vendee. Scroggins v. McDougall, 8 Ala. 382.
VENUE-DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE-PERSONAL INTEST.-BRITTAIN v.
MONROE COUNTY, 63 Am. RE'. io76 (PA.).-Held, that in an action against
a county, the plea that the presiding judge is a property owner and tax-
payer of the county, does not make him "personally interested" so as to
require a change of venue.
The rule generally prevails to the effect that the "interest" of a judge,
constituting a reason for changing the venue, must be pecuniary, Hun-
gerford v. Cushing, 2 Wis. 397; State v. Winget, 37 Ohio St 153; and
he is within that rule when he is related to either litigant, or interested
in a litigated case, De La Guerra v. Burton, 23 Cal. 592; In re White's
Estate, 37 Cal. igo. But this rule has been held almost universally among
the states as not applying to a judge sitting in the trial of a cause against a
county of which he is an inhabitant, Justices of Burlington County v. Fenni-
more, I N. J. Law. I9o; and the same to a town, city or state, Kilbourn v.
State, 9 Conn. 56o; Commonwealth v. Emery, 65 Mass. 4o6. Such an objec-
tion is not valid because the "interest" is too shadowy, indirect, remote and
contingent to be within the rule "that a man cannot be a judge in his own
case." Myer v. San Diego, 41 L. R. A. 762; State v. MacDonald, 26 Minn.
445. But a judge owning taxable property in a city against which proceed-
ings are brought to annul the corporation and remove its officers, is dis-
qualified to try the cause, State v. City of Cisco, (Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 244
(Tex.). However, there appears to be but one case to mar the universality
of the "interest rule" in its application to a judge's disqualification by reason
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of the fact that he is a taxpayer in the county against which a suit is brought
Jefferson County Supervisors v. Milwaukee County Supervisors, 2o Wis. 139.
WitNESSES-IMEACHMENT-CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS.-CINCINNATI
TRAcTION Co. V. STEPHENS, 79 N. E. 235 (O.).--Held, that where, upon
the trial of a case, a witness is shown to have made statements of fact
contradictory to those made by him on the trial, it is error to permit
an attempt to rehabilitate the impeached witness by proving that he had made
prior statements similar to those made on the trial.
The general tendency, if there are exceptions to the general rule stated
above, is that those exceptions occur in the courts of some of the Southern
states and of a few in the West People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; State v.
Fontenat, 48 La. Ann. 283; Johnson v. Patterson, 9 N. C. 183. But the courts
of the East, North and Central states uphold the general majority rule, Con-
rad v. Griffey, 52 U. S. 48o; Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 76 Mass. 485; Smith
v. Stickney, i7 Barb. (N. Y.) 489; State v. Vincent, 24 Ia. 57o. This
majority rule is further supported-for the making of the inconsistent state-
ment being admitted by the witness, proof of prior statements consistent
with the statement of the witness on the trial, for the purpose of corroborat-
ing and sustaining the credit of the witness, is irrelevant because it would
not prove the truthfulness of the witness, nor the reliability of his recollec-
tion, nor that there was no inconsistency between the two statements,
i Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.) 469.
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